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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
CPL that authorize the issuance of eavesdropping warrants for a
period of interception no longer than thirty days. Stressing the im-
portance of strictly construing eavesdropping statutes, the court
held that the thirty days begins to run on the day the warrant is
issued unless the issuing court specifies another date of commence-
ment in the warrant. The members of Volume 60 hope that the
cases considered in The Survey will be of help and interest to the
New York bench and bar.
CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND RULES
CPLR 321: Remedy of rescission available to party who violates
statute by negotiating settlement pro se without effectively dis-
charging an attorney of record
CPLR 3211 provides that a party to a civil action who appears2
by counsel is prohibited from acting for himself in the action ex-
cept by permission of the court.3 Further, if a party wishes to ap-
See CPLR 321 (Supp. 1986). Section 321(a) of the CPLR provides:
(a) A party, other than one specified in section 1201, may prosecute or defend a
civil action in person or by attorney, except that a corporation... shall appear
by attorney, except as otherwise provided in section 1809 of the New York city
civil court act, the uniform district court act, the uniform city court act and the
uniform justice court act. If a party appears by attorney he may not act in person
in the action except by consent of the court.
Id.; WK&M T 321.01 (1985).
Courts generally have stated that the purpose of § 321 is to avoid confusion regarding
the identity of the individual who has authority to act in an ongoing litigation. See infra
note 28 and accompanying text.
Section 321(a) of the CPLR was adopted substantially unchanged from CPA 236. See
FOURTH REP. 190; FINAL REP. 281; SIXTH REP. 119; CPLR 321, commentary at 411 (1972).
Several older cases construing CPA 236 are treated in this survey to aid in an analysis of the
corresponding CPLR section.
2 See CPLR 320(a). A formal appearance is made when a party either "serve[s] an
answer or a notice of appearance," or "mak[es] a motion which has the effect of extending
the time to answer." Id.
3 See CPLR 321(a); H. WACHTELL, NEW YORK PRACTICE UNDER THE CPLR 66-67 (5th
ed. 1976); accord Carlisle v. County of Nassau, 64 App. Div. 2d 15, 19, 408 N.Y.S.2d 114, 117
(2d Dep't 1978) (although party represented by counsel at trial may not act, he may help
plan trial strategy). Compare Chase Manhattan Bank (N.A.) v. O'Flynn, N.Y.L.J., June 22,
1984, at 12, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County June 21, 1984) (despite contention that such was
delay tactic, defendant who properly discharged his attorney could act on his own behalf)
with Cann v. Cann, 204 Misc. 1069, 1071, 127 N.Y.S.2d 55, 58 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1954)
(once defendant represented by counsel, counsel can be served on defendant's behalf).
The rule against pro se representation by a party represented by counsel predates the
codification of civil procedure in New York. See Webb v. Dill, 18 Abb. Pr. 264, 264 (Sup. Ct.
1st Dist. 1865). This principle is closely related to the premise permitting a party to retain
only one attorney of record in a particular action. Cf. Dobbins v. County of Erie, 58 App.
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pear pro se, but already has an attorney of record, he may do so
only by discharging the attorney in the manner prescribed by sec-
tion 321.4 Accordingly, the general rule in New York is that absent
a proper discharge of a party's attorney of record, a party's subse-
quent acts in a judicial proceeding will be deemed ineffective. 5 Re-
Div. 2d 733, 733, 395 N.Y.S.2d 865, 866-67 (4th Dep't 1977) (mem.) (second attorney not
formally substituted for attorney of record lacked standing to make motion to dismiss);
Kitsch v. Riker Oil Co., 23 App. Div. 2d 502, 503, 256 N.Y.S.2d 536, 536 (2d Dep't 1965)
(mem.) (second attorney prohibited from applying for relief to court when plaintiff already
represented by counsel); Jackson v. Trapier, 42 Misc. 2d 139, 141, 247 N.Y.S.2d 315, 316
(Sup. Ct. Queens County 1964) (prohibiting two attorneys from representing insured party).
Thus, an attorney who is not the attorney of record has no authority to represent a party in
an action. See Dobbins, 58 App. Div. 2d at 733, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 866-67; Kitsch, 23 App. Div.
2d at 503, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 536; Trapier, 42 Misc. 2d at 141, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 316. But see
Deacon's Bench, Inc. v. Hoffman, 88 App. Div. 2d 734, 735, 451 N.Y.S.2d 861, 862 (3d Dep't
1982) (mem.) (accepting improperly substituted attorney's appearance because of untimely
objection of opposing party and absence of prejudice); Palmer v. Palmer, 62 Misc. 2d 73, 75-
76, 308 N.Y.S.2d 562, 565-66 (Family Ct. Dutchess County 1969) (late filing of notice of
substitution of attorneys excused because opposing party not prejudiced and denial would
cause delay).
4 CPLR 321(b); see, e.g., Chase Manhattan Bank (N.A.) v. O'Flynn, N.Y.L.J., June 22,
1984, at 12, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County June 21, 1984) (section 321(a) not applicable
"where a party pro se is substituted upon dismissal of its attorney"). But cf. Antoinette D.
v. Christopher M., 54 App. Div. 2d 564, 564, 387 N.Y.S.2d 19, 20 (2d Dep't 1976) (mem.)
(affirming family court decision which allowed petitioner to conduct own case while repre-
sented by absent attorney).
Two methods are prescribed by CPLR 321(b) for discharging an attorney.
1.. . . an attorney of record may be changed by filing with the clerk a consent to
the change signed by the retiring attorney and signed and acknowledged by the
party...
2. An attorney of record may withdraw or be changed by order of the court in
which the action is pending ...
Id.; see also WK&M 321.11, at 3-399 to 3-400 (1985). Both methods of discharge require
that all parties or their attorneys in the action be notified. CPLR 321(b). To obtain a court
order allowing withdrawal, a motion is made for an order to show cause as to why an attor-
ney should not be withdrawn. See Universal Elevator Co. v. Jordan Elevator Co., N.Y.L.J.,
Aug. 27, 1981, at 1, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Aug. 26, 1981). Several earlier cases cited
herein may refer to CPA 56, from which CPLR 321 was derived.
" See, e.g., Johnson v. Antonopoulos, 213 App. Div. 324, 325, 210 N.Y.S. 589, 590 (2d
Dep't 1925) (declaring stipulation agreement ineffective); Sterns v. Stevans, 20 Misc. 2d 417,
419, 194 N.Y.S.2d 367, 369 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1959) (refusing to consider telegram
directed to court by defendant). The general rule is that until an attorney of record is effec-
tively discharged, such an attorney "is authorized to act for all purposes incidental to the
entry and enforcement of the judgment; as to the adverse parties his authority continues
unabated." Hendry v. Hilton, 283 App. Div. 168, 172, 127 N.Y.S.2d 454, 458 (2d Dep't 1953);
see also Ohlquist v. Nordstrom, 143 Misc. 502, 504, 257 N.Y.S. 711, 713-14 (Sup. Ct.
Chatauqua County 1932) (attorney's power continues until formal dismissal), affd, 238 App.
Div. 766, 261 N.Y.S. 1039 (4th Dep't), aff'd, 262 N.Y. 696, 188 N.E. 125 (1933). This concept
is most often applied in cases in which the adverse party serves papers on the original attor-
ney of record. See, e.g., Hess v. Tyszko, 46 App. Div. 2d 980, 980, 362 N.Y.S.2d 287, 289 (3d
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cently in Moustakas v. Bouloukos,6 the New York Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, Second Department, held that a plaintiff who
improperly discharged his attorney of record and subsequently en-
tered into a settlement agreement with the defendant, could rely
on CPLR 321 as a basis to rescind the settlement.
7
In Moustakas, both the plaintiff and the defendant were 50%
shareholders in each of two corporations." As a result of a conflict
between the parties, three separate lawsuits were commenced in
the Supreme Court, Nassau County.9 The plaintiff, Moustakas,
brought a shareholder's derivative action and a special proceeding
seeking dissolution of one of the corporations, while the defendant
appeared on behalf of himself and the other corporation. 10 At the
outset of the litigation, both parties were represented by counsel.11
However, while the actions were pending, the plaintiff sought to
dismiss his attorney by means of a handwritten letter informing
him of the discharge. 12 One month later, the plaintiff met pro se
with the defendant, who was accompanied by counsel, at which
time the parties entered into a written agreement settling the liti-
gation.13 Subsequently, the plaintiff brought an action to rescind
the settlement.1 4 The Supreme Court, Nassau County, held for the
plaintiff,1 5 and the Appellate Division, Second Department, af-
Dep't 1974) (until attorney properly discharged, service upon that attorney is valid); Cann v.
Cann, 204 Misc. 1069, 1071-72, 127 N.Y.S.2d 55, 58 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1953) (service
upon attorney valid until attorney properly discharged). Nevertheless, if a party intention-
ally serves an attorney whom he realizes has been "informally discharged" that party should
be subject to discipline for a "breach of professional ethics." WK&M % 321.11, at 3-400 to 3-
401 (1985).
6 112 App. Div. 2d 981, 492 N.Y.S.2d 793 (2d Dep't 1985) (mem.)
7 See id. at 984, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 795.
8 Id. at 982, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 794.
9 Id. The three actions leading to the settlement underlying the Moustakas cases were:
a proceeding brought by Moustakas for the dissolution of Seacrest Diner, Inc.; a share-
holder's derivative action brought by Moustakas against Bouloukos and Seacrest; and a





13 Id. Moustakas executed the settlement agreement personally, and as president of
Seacrest Diner, Inc. Id. The plaintiff's attorney was informed of the settlement in a letter
from the defendant's attorney two weeks later; the court found it significant that the defen-
dant's attorney referred to Moustakas as the "client" of the plaintiff's attorney. Id.
14 Id.
" Id. at 982-83, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 794.
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firmed the decision."6
In a memorandum opinion, the Second Department observed
that an attorney of record in a pending action may be dismissed
only in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law.17 There-
fore, the letter delivered by the plaintiff to his attorney did not
effectuate a discharge because it did not meet the standards set
forth in CPLR 321(b)(2). 18 The court further stated that because
the plaintiff did not effectively discharge his attorney of record, he
could not act pro se in the settlement of the pending suits without
consent of the court.19 The court interpreted section 321 as pro-
tecting the very party who had improperly discharged his attorney
and proceeded to deal with the adverse party, who was represented
by counsel. 0 In addition, the court held that section 321(a) of the
CPLR prohibited the plaintiff from representing a corporation in
the settlement because a corporationn may appear only by coun-
sel.21 Moreover, the Appellate Division noted that by communicat-
ing directly with the plaintiff, who was still legally bound by coun-
sel, the attorney for the defendant violated the New York Code of
18 Id.
17 Id. at 983, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 795; see also CPLR 321(b). The court noted that a client
can dismiss his attorney at any time with or without cause. 112 App. Div. 2d at 983, 492
N.Y.S.2d at 795; see Demov, Morris, Levin & Sheen v. Glantz, 53 N.Y.2d 555, 556-57, 428
N.E.2d 387, 389, 444 N.Y.S.2d 55, 57 (1983) (dismissing plaintiff's cause of action for fraud
and breach of retainer agreement against former client). The right to dismiss, however, is
subject to some restrictions and qualifications. See, e.g., In re Weitling, 266 N.Y. 184, 186,
194 N.E. 401, 402 (1935) (attorney entitled to fair and reasonable compensation for services
rendered); Local 2, Int'l Union of Police v. Davis, 27 App. Div. 2d 650, 651, 276 N.Y.S.2d
837, 838 (1st Dep't 1967) (mem.) (termination procedure of CPLR 321 applicable only to
representations in action, not to retainer agreement).
1 See 112 App. Div. 2d at 983, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 792.
19 Id.
20 See id. at 984, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 795.
21 Id.; accord Lefkowitz v. Therapeutic Hypnosis, Inc., 52 App. Div. 2d 1017, 1017, 383
N.Y.S.2d 868, 869 (3d Dep't 1976) (mem.) (individual who was not attorney could not ap-
pear on behalf of corporate defendant); W.T. Grant Co. v. Payne, 64 Misc. 2d 797, 798, 315
N.Y.S.2d 910, 911-12 (Steuben County Ct. 1970) (reversing default judgment against defen-
dant because plaintiff corporation was not represented by counsel); WK&M 321.05, at 3-
394 to 3-394.1. The rationale underlying the requirement that a corporation may only ap-
pear by counsel is that "a corporation is a hydra-headed entity and its shareholders are
insulated from personal responsibility. There must therefore be a designated spokesman
accountable to the Court." Austrian, Lance & Stewart, P.C. v. Hastings Properties, Inc., 87
Misc. 2d 25, 26, 385 N.Y.S.2d 466, 467 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1976). But see Employment
Claim Control Serv. Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Bd., 35 N.Y.2d 492, 498, 323 N.E.2d
689, 692, 364 N.Y.S.2d 149, 152 (1974) (cautiously allowing controlled use of non-lawyers to
represent employers in workers compensation proceedings).
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Professional Responsibility.2 2
As stated by the court in Moustakas,5 CPLR 321 generally
has been used to protect the rights of adverse parties.24 Most sig-
nificantly, the statute ensures that a party knows the identity of
the opposing party's attorney, thereby facilitating the service of
documents.25 Furthermore, because an attorney of record remains
servable as the agent of his client until he is discharged2" by either
a stipulation filed with the court or by a court order,27 an adverse
party is also protected from losing jurisdiction over a party during
an ongoing action.28 The awareness of the parties and the court as
to whether an individual or his attorney has the authority to act at
any given time is necessary to avoid chaos in judicial proceedings. 29
22 See 112 App. Div. 2d at 983, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 795; see also N.Y.S.BA CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONsmILrrY DR 7-104(a)(1) (McKinney 1975). DR 7-104(a)(1) provides:
(A) During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not:
(1) Communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the represen-
tation with a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that matter unless
he has the prior consent of the lawyer representing such other party or is author-
ized by law to do so.
(2) Give advice to a person who is not represented by a lawyer, other than the
advice to secure counsel, if the interest of such person are or have a reasonable
possibility of being in conflict with the interests of his client.
Id.
3 See 112 App. Div. 2d at 984, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 795.
2" See infra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
25 See CPLR 321(b)(1), (2) (notice of attorney change must be given to all parties in
the action); Kitsch v. Riker Oil Co., 23 App. Div. 2d 502, 503, 256 N.Y.S.2d 536, 536 (2d
Dep't 1965) (mem.) (CPLR 321 prohibits party from being represented by more than one
attorney); Jackson v. Trapier, 42 Misc. 2d 139, 141, 247 N.Y.S.2d 315, 316 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County 1964) (if more than one attorney "plaintiff would be required to serve duplicate
papers"); Title Guar. & Trust Co. v. Uniform Fibrous Talc Co., 127 Misc. 183, 187, 215
N.Y.S. 437, 441 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1926) ("Itlhis rule is designed to... insure to an
opposing party that an attorney assuming to act for a party is authorized to do so, to the
end that such party may know upon whom necessary notices or papers may be served"). See
generally CPLR 2103(b) (Supp. 1984-1985) ("Except where otherwise prescribed by law or
order of court, papers to be served upon a party in a pending action shall be served upon his
attorney").
26 See supra note 5 (cases upholding validity of service upon original attorney improp-
erly discharged).
27 See CPLR 321(b); supra note 4 (text and dicussion of CPLR 321(b)).
2"8 See, e.g., Cann v. Cann, 204 Misc 1069, 1071-72, 127 N.Y.S.2d 55, 58 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1954) (defendant prohibited from escaping jurisdiction of the court because his at-
torney of record was not properly dicharged and remained servable).
29 See WK&M 321.07, at 3-396. It has been stated that § 321 of the CPLR was
designed to "avoid the confusion which would otherwise result if other litigants and the
courts were not aware of whom was in charge of the case." Id.; see, e.g., Jackson v. Trapier,
42 Misc. 2d 139, 141, 247 N.Y.S.2d 315, 316 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1964) (representation
by more than one attorney would create "chaos in the the courts"); Webb v. Dill, 18 Abb.
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It is submitted that the Moustakas decision is justifiable to
the extent that the language of section 32130 and case law3' do not
preclude an interpretation protecting the very party who has inap-
propriately discharged his attorney.32 Furthermore, although no
court has expressly construed section 321 as offering the protection
afforded in Moustakas, several early cases have stated that parties
may seek recission of settlements they improperly negotiated with-
out informing their attorneys of record. 3
However, while the Second Department's interpretation of
section 321 may be consistent with the apparent plain meaning of
the statute, it is submitted that the decision imprudently allows a
party to benefit from his own violation of a statute34-a conse-
quence that several courts have chosen to avoid when applying the
corporate representation provision of section 321. 35 Indeed, courts
Pr. 264, 264 (Sup. Ct. 1st Dist. 1865) (courts require proceedings to be through attorney who
appears, otherwise there would be "great confusion in the Administration of Justice").
30 See supra notes 1-2.
31 See supra notes 4, 25, 27, 28 (cases discussing the purposes of CPLR 321); cf. Barles
v. Johnson Elec. Corp., 44 Misc. 2d 918, 919, 255 N.Y.S.2d 350, 352 (Sup. Ct. Queens County
1964) ("one attorney of record" requirement necessary to protect client from "bearing the
brunt" of disagreements among his counselors).
32 See CPLR 321 (Supp. 1984-1985). The wording of CPLR 321 does not limit applica-
tion of the statute to the protection of adverse parties. See id. In fact, § 321(b) requires that
notice of an attorney change must be given to all parties in an action. See supra note 4
(discussion and text of CPLR 321(b)). It is suggested that by definition, this would include
notifying fellow plaintiffs or defendants who in most cases would be friendly parties.
Section 321(a) states that "[i]f a party appears by attorney he may not act in person in
the action except by consent of the court." CPLR 321(a) (emphasis added). It is submitted
that the statute, without further qualification, unambiguously declares ineffective the acts of
any party who already is represented by counsel. Accordingly, the court's decision is consis-
tent with the statute if the " plain meaning" method of statutory interpretation is applied.
See In re Estate of Kleefeld, 55 N.Y.2d 253, 259, 433 N.E.2d 521, 524, 448 N.Y.S.2d 456, 459
(1982) ("[t]his court should not ignore the words of the statute, clear on its face, to reach a
different result through judicial interpretation"); 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUC-
TION § 46.01, at 74 (Sands 4th ed.) (if language is clear, unambiguous and uncontrolled by
other statutory provisions, court can not give it different meaning).
'3 See, e.g., Johnson v. Antonopoulos, 213 App. Div. 324, 325, 210 N.Y.S. 589, 590 (2d
Dep't 1925) (defendant not permitted to raise as defense stipulation signed by plaintiff im-
properly acting pro se); Anderson v. Anderson, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 15, 1964, at 16, col. 3 (Sup. Ct.
Bronx County Dec. 14, 1964) (dictum) (party who improperly signs stipulation pro se may
move to have such stipulation set aside).
34 In a situation resembling Moustakas, one court ruled that a defendant corporation
should not be permitted to benefit from the wilful disregard by its president of the rule that
a court proceeding should be handled by a member of the bar of that particular jurisdiction.
See Packer v. First Multifund of America, Inc., N.Y.L.J., July 29, 1975, at 10, col. 6 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County July 28, 1975).
3' See, e.g., King Shell Serv. Station v. Robert S. Douglas Co., 106 Misc. 2d 57, 59, 430
N.Y.S.2d 484, 486 (J. Ct. Weschester County 1980) (improper appearance by one party
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have asserted that CPLR 321 "is not intended to penalize the ad-
verse party for the corporation's improper appearance."36 Addi-
tionally, the decision is inconsistent with the policy of liberal con-
struction officially espoused by the CPLR to "secure the just,
speedy . . . determination of every civil judicial proceeding. 37
Notwithstanding this inconsistency with public policy, by ap-
plying the plain meaning of CPLR 321, the court could not have
reached any other conclusion absent a legislative amendment.
Joseph S. Nicotra
should not penalize opposing party); Cohn v. Warschauer Sick Support Soc. Bnei Israel
Sup., 19 N.Y.S.2d 742, 743 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 2d Dep't 1940) (corporation cannot move to set
aside judgment on ground that corporation was not represented by counsel).
It is submitted that the facts in Moustakas are analogous to those in King Shell and
Cohn because the plaintiff, relying on his own violation of CPLR 321, endeavored to nullify
prior actions that presumably did not give rise to a desired result. In contrast to earlier
cases, however, the court in Moustakas permitted the plaintiff to rescind the settlement
agreement, see 112 App. Div. 2d at 982-83, 492 N.Y.S. at 795, thus failing to uphold the
legal maxim prohibiting a party from benefiting from his own wrongdoing. The influence of
this legal maxim is deeply rooted in many areas of the law. See, e.g., Ross v. Ross, 84 App.
Div. 2d 569, 570, 443 N.Y.S.2d 419, 420 (2d Dep't 1981) (mem.) (appellate court refused to
grant husband divorce from wife he wrongfully abandoned), af'd, 55 N.Y.2d 999, 434
N.E.2d 717, 449 N.Y.S.2d 481 (1982); People v. Velez, 124 Misc. 2d 612, 614, 477 N.Y.S.2d
78, 79 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1984) (no violation of speedy trial rights when computer
failed to reveal prior arrests because of defendant's use of alias); Continental Metals Corp.
v. Municipal Warehouse Co., 112 Misc. 2d 923, 926, 447 N.Y.S.2d 849, 851-52 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1982) (in event of intentional taking of bailed property, bailee deprived of contrac-
tual benefit of shortened time to sue), aff'd, 92 App. Div. 2d 47, 459 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1st Dep't
1983).
Clearly, if this maxim was disregarded, the effect "would be to place premium on deceit
and fraud." Velez, 124 Misc. 2d at 614, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 79. Similarly, "it would be a perver-
sion of our adversary system if a litigant could be deprived of a victory because of the
deriliction of his or her opponent." Cuevas v. Cuevas, 110 App. Div. 2d 873, 880, 488
N.Y.S.2d 725, 730-31 (2d Dep't 1985) (Titone, J., dissenting) (quoting Department of Social
Servs. v. Toustum C.D., 97 App. Div. 2d 831, 831, 468 N.Y.S.2d 908, 908 (2d Dep't 1983)
(mem.)).
36 King Shell Serv. Station v. Robert S. Douglas Co., 106 Misc. 2d 57, 59, 430 N.Y.S.2d
484, 486 (J. Ct. Westchester County 1980) (quoting Cohn v. Warschauer Sick Support Soc.
Bnei Israel Sup., 19 N.Y.S.2d 742, 743 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 2d Dep't 1940)).
37 CPLR 104 (1972); see Coonradt v. Walco, 55 Misc. 2d 557, 558, 285 N.Y.S.2d 421, 424
(Sup. Ct. Albany County 1967) ("procedural rules should be primarily a means to the end of
securing the just resolution of controversies on the merits and at a minimum of expense and
delay"). It is submitted that the Moustakas decision contravenes the CPLR philosophy by
creating a vehicle by which litigation between parties can be prolonged. Instead, the CPLR
should be used to "expedit[e] and streamlin[e] the practice of law and the work of the
courts." Burbell v. Burman, 44 Misc. 2d 749, 750, 255 N.Y.S.2d 56, 58 (Sup. Ct. Bronx
County 1964).
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